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Abstract
This paper investigates the eﬀects of public childcare availability in
Italy on mothers’ working status and children’s scholastic achievements.
We use a newly available dataset containing individual standardized test
scores of pupils attending second grade of primary school in 2008-09 in
conjunction with data on public childcare availability. Public childcare
coverage in Italy is scarce (12.7 percent versus the OECD average of 30
percent) and the service is "rationed": each municipality allocates the
available slots according to eligibility criteria. We contribute to the exist-
ing literature taking into account rationing in public childcare access and
the functioning of childcare market. Our estimates indicate that childcare
availability has positive and signiﬁcant eﬀe c t so nb o t hm o t h e r s ’w o r k i n g
status and children’s language test scores. The eﬀects are stronger when
the degree of rationing is high and for low educated mothers and children
living in lower income areas of the country.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Advocates for public intervention in childcare provision oﬀer two main argu-
ments: 1) childcare providing children’s "physical care" may support mothers’
participation in the labour market and 2) childcare providing early childhood
education may contribute to children’s cognitive and non-cognitive development,
especially for disadvantaged children, leading to gains in the accumulation of
human capital in the society.
Existing research on the impact of childcare supply on maternal employment
has been recently accompanied by growing interest in the impact of childcare
on childhood development. Such studies suggest that children’s cognitive and
non-cognitive outcomes are largely determined early in life and that returns on
investments in early childhood are higher than those on investments at later
stages, especially for disadvantaged children (Carneiro and Heckman, 2003).
Inputs from families as well as from the school system during early childhood
play a very signiﬁcant role in later cognitive, social, and behavioral outcomes
(Heckman et al., 2006).
Childcare institutions are important arenas for children’s development, and
expanding childcare coverage is an explicit goal in many countries. In 2002, the
European Union Presidency established the goal of providing "childcare by 2010
to at least 90 percent of children between 3 years old and the mandatory school
age and at least 33 percent of children under 3 years of age" (EU, 2002).
Exploring the roles of public childcare is particularly relevant in Italy, where
the labour market participation of mothers is much lower than in other European
countries and children do less well in school than their European counterparts.
In Italy, only 54 percent of mothers are employed, while this value is over 70
percent in the UK, France and Germany.1 Furthermore, according to 2006
data from PISA (the Programme for International Student Assessment), 15-
year-old Italian students rank fourth from the bottom in average educational
performance among advanced countries (OECD, 2007).
Given the large number of children from single-child families, their main
opportunities for early socialization may be those provided by childcare services
and investments in childcare policies may also help alleviate intergenerational
persistence, especially for children from low-income families. Instead, recent
data (OECD, 2010) show that public investment in pre-school education in
Italy is among the lowest in Europe.2
As a result, childcare is far less readily available than in other European
countries: according to ISTAT (2010), only 12.7 percent of children aged 0-2
years in Italy have access to public childcare facilities and, despite the persis-
tence of strong traditional values, which say that the child is better oﬀ in his/her
mother’s care, the demand for public childcare is still higher than supply in all
Italian regions. When childcare applications outnumber supply, the municipal-
1Data from Eurostat referred to 2009.
2According to data from OECD Family Database for 2005, public expenditure on child
care and early education services in Italy is equivalent to 0.6 percent of GDP, while this ﬁgure
for France, Sweden and Denmark is higher than 1 percent (OECD, 2010).
2ities, as the main decision makers in childcare policies, settle how to allocate
the limited number of slots deﬁning eligibility requirements according to their
preferences. For example, childcare may be limited to children from low income
families, to provide them educational opportunities and better inputs for their
development than those received at home, or to those with working mothers, to
support parents’ conciliation between parenthood and work.
Our paper explores the role of public childcare in Italy, investigating its im-
pact on mothers’ working status and children’s educational outcomes. We use
a newly available dataset on children’s primary school performance,in conjunc-
tion with data on public childcare coverage at the provincial level. Although the
data do not allow us to analyze the determinants of parents’ childcare demand,
our main contribution to the existing literature on childcare’s impacts would be
to take into account rationing in public childcare access.
I nt h eb a s es p e c i ﬁcation, controlling for children’s and parents’ character-
istics, we ﬁnd that childcare availability is positively related to mothers’ par-
ticipation in the labour market as well as to language test scores. Once we
account for rationing, we ﬁnd that in areas where applications outnumber the
slots available and where the probability of getting a slot depends more on eli-
gibility criteria deﬁned by the social planner, childcare has stronger eﬀects. We
explore also heterogenous eﬀects and show that childcare’s impacts are larger
for children with lower educated mothers and living in lower income areas.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review the
existing literature concerning the impact of childcare on both mothers’ par-
ticipation and children’s cognitive outcomes. In Section 3 we describe public
childcare in Italy and its features, with particular attention to eligibility cri-
teria and rationing; in Section 4, we present a theoretical model, representing
the framework for our empirical analysis. In Section 5 we deﬁne the empirical
strategy and the issues involved in the estimation, while Section 6 provides a
description of the data and variables used. In Section 7 the empirical results
are discussed: we ﬁrst present empirical results from the base model (Section
7.1); then, we show results from the analysis by level of rationing (Section 7.2)
and additional heterogenous eﬀects (Section 7.3). Finally, Section 8 concludes.
2 The Literature
Several studies have analyzed the role of childcare as an important tool for
reconciling work and family commitments during the childbearing years. Studies
in the U.S. have mainly focused on programs for disadvantaged households and
children.3
The empirical research analyzing the impact of childcare availability reports
mixed ﬁndings. Havnes and Mogstad (2009a) analyze the impact of a change
in childcare availability in Norway and ﬁnd no signiﬁcant eﬀect on mothers’
participation in the labour market, similarly to some studies for the U.S. (Cascio,
2009). Baker et al. (2008) evaluate the impact of public childcare programs in
3See Blau and Currie (2006) and Ruhm (2004) for excellent surveys.
3Quebec (Canada), ﬁnding that the introduction of generous childcare subsidies
led to a strong increase in employment for married mothers.
For Italy, Del Boca (2002), Del Boca and Vuri (2007) and Del Boca et al.
(2009) ﬁnd a positive impact of childcare coverage and childcare subsidies on
the likelihood of mothers working. In particular, Del Boca and Vuri (2007) take
into account the impact of rationing, due to childcare system rigidity (in terms
of accessibility, opening time and costs), and ﬁnd that in areas with higher
childcare availability the probability of female employment increases.
In recent years, economic analyses have also focused on the impact of child-
care on children’s outcomes. In the economics literature on human capital,
Becker (1964) has pointed out that the returns to investments in early child-
hood are likely to be relatively high, simply because of the long time in which
to reap the rewards. Carneiro and Heckman (2003) took this argument further,
arguing that investments in early childhood have higher returns for children
living in disadvantaged contexts. Early childhood educational programs can
generate learning gains in the short-run and, in many cases, improve the long-
run prospects of children, especially from low-income families.
A number of studies for the U.S. show that the evidence regarding this impact
is limited to short-run outcomes and that the ﬁndings are mixed. Loeb et al.
(2007), for instance, ﬁnd that pre-primary education in the U.S. is associated
with improved reading and mathematics skills at primary school entry. Positive
eﬀects of childcare on children’s short-run
outcomes are also found by Fitzpatrick (2008) but the impacts depend
strongly on ethnicity and family income. Other studies (Magnuson et al., 2007)
conﬁrm these results, showing that the positive eﬀects dissipate for most chil-
dren already by the end of ﬁrst grade, while larger and longer lasting associ-
ations with academic gains are found for disadvantaged children. Melhuish et
al. (2008) suggest that children with low educated parents beneﬁtm o s tf r o m
childcare attendance.
Research from Europe focuses on public childcare, which is more widespread
than in the U.S., especially in Northern countries. Datta Gupta and Simonsen
(2010) evaluate the impact of childcare exposure at age 3 on children’s cognitive
outcomes at age 11, in Denmark. They ﬁnd that having attended high-quality
pre-school (instead of family day-care) has a positive impact on language and
problem solving tests scores, while it decreases the probability of grade reten-
tion. Other studies use information on childcare coverage at aggregate level,
as we do in this paper. Havnes and Mogstad (2009b and 2010) ﬁnd that a
substantial change in childcare supply in Norway has strong positive impacts
on children’s outcomes, although the impact is much stronger for children of
low educated parents. Their results suggest a positive and signiﬁcant impact of
childcare coverage on educational outcomes, such as years of education and col-
lege attendance, but also on long-term outcomes, such as adult earnings. Felfe
and Lalive (2010), instead, exploit a variation in childcare supply in Germany
and ﬁnd positive and signiﬁcant eﬀects on language skills in the short run and
on school grades in the medium run.
In Italy, the topic of early child intervention, childcare impact and children’s
4outcome has largely been neglected. Only very recently there has been avail-
ability of data on children’s outcomes (ISFOL, INVALSI and local data sources
referring to speciﬁc areas, such as Emilia Romagna and Piedmont), which made
it possible to consider the impact of childcare not only from the standpoint of
physical care but also in terms of its role in educating young children. Del Boca
and Pasqua (2010) compare diﬀerent Italian data sources and show a positive
correlation between childcare use and subsequent cognitive outcomes of children.
Finally, other related literature has investigated the functioning of the child-
care market in Italy and the criteria used to allocate the limited slots to house-
holds (Bosi and Silvestri, 2008; Antonelli and Grembi, 2010).In our work we
estimate the impacts of childcare availability on mother’s working status and
children’s outcomes taking into account the role of rationing in public child-
care access and the mechanisms implemented by the social planner to allocate
available slots.
3 Childcare in Italy
While Italy is ranked quite high for its childcare policies for children aged
3-6, it fares much worse for its policies for children under three: public childcare
for children aged 3 or older has a utilization rate of 95 percent, whereas public
childcare for children younger than 3 is used by only 12.7 percent of children
(ISTAT, 2010).
In Italy, childcare policy is decentralized: the municipality is the main
decision-maker, while the regions deﬁne general management criteria;4 the cen-
tral government is only responsible for deﬁning common objective standards and
resources allocation among regions. This may explain why availability of public
childcare for children under three varies greatly across regions, from around 25
per cent in some areas in the North to under 5 percent in most of the South
(see Figure 1). Furthermore, in the last years, childcare supply from private
providers has increased and developed diﬀerently across Italian regions (Istituto
Degli Innocenti, 2002 and 2009). Public childcare diﬀers from private childcare
in several ways. For instance, public services are more strictly regulated both in
terms of service standards and in terms of management and personnel require-
ments (Istituto Degli Innocenti, 2002) As recently stated in Budget Law 2002,5
one of the most important aim of public childcare is educational. This goal has
been implemented through the introduction of quality standards, especially in
regions with greater experience in childcare provision (such as Emilia Romagna
and Tuscany). Public childcare is also less expensive than the private one, since
it is highly subsidized (Del Boca et al., 2005).
Although it is higher-quality and less expensive than either private childcare
or baby-sitting services, public childcare is used by only a fraction of Italian
4To date, in Italy there are 8,092 municipalitiesin 101 provinces and 20 regions.
5Law 448/2001 (Budget Law 2002) deﬁned formal childcare as "structures aimed at grant-
ing the development and socialization of girls and boys aged between 3 months and 3 years
and to support families and parents with young children".
5households. This is the outcome of both families’ and municipalities’ decisions.
Families’ decisions are often conditioned by persistent, strongly-rooted cultural
norms. In Southern European countries, and Italy in particular, the traditional
role of mothers is still highly valued and, hence, mothers are considered the best
caregivers for their children.
Zollino (2008) uses data from ISTAT (Italian Survey on Births, ISB 2005)
and the Bank of Italy (Survey on Household Income and Wealth, SHIW 2006)
to analyze demand and supply factors of childcare services in Italy. Using both
data sources, he estimates that all Italian households with children aged 0-2 may
be classiﬁed in the following way: 58 percent of them did not apply since they
prefer to care for their children on their own or to rely on informal childcare
(grandparents, friends or relatives); nearly 18 percent of households report that
were discouraged by the diﬃculties (distance, hours of services); 5 percent of
households are explicitely rationed, meaning that they applied but did not ob-
tain a slot; ﬁnally, only 19 percent of all applicants are actually assigned a slot.
Furthermore, Zollino (2008) points out that data suggest a positive relationship
between childcare coverage and the number of applications. In other words, the
greater the supply of public childcare, the greater the parents’ demand. This
may also be associated to the level of trust people have in childcare institutions.
Parents’ trust may depend on the supply and quality of childcare, and on how
long the systems have been in place. In fact, in regions with a longer tradition
of childcare (such as Emilia Romagna) not only is the supply of childcare higher
(in terms of the number of slots) but so is the demand (in terms of the number
of applicants).
As Figure 2 shows, the demand for childcare is higher than the supply every-
where in Italy. In regions where public childcare is established for longer time
and more widespread, the number of applications is greater. Northern regions
have a large number of applicants and a higher number of slots, whereas South-
ern regions have fewer slots and lower demand.
On the supply side, the municipalities’ decisions concerning the number of
childcare slots to oﬀer depend on their preferences, as to which types of house-
hold to target, and on their budget constraints. Each municipality establishes
eligibility requirements so that the number of available slots can be assigned
to households who beneﬁtm o r e . 6 While absolute priority is given to applica-
tions of children with disability,the other criteria can be classiﬁed into two main
categories. The ﬁrst category include mainly the following eligibility criteria:
having both parents working (part-time or full-time), having parents with turns
at work or commuting, having other siblings (an higher score is given if siblings
are aged 0-3). The second category includes mostly criteria related to the socio-
economic conditions of the household, such as being orphan or fostered child,
having one or both parents unemployed, living with single parent.7
6Bosi and Silvestri (2008) argue that the municipality has imperfect information about the
real demand of childcare, so that eligibility criteria can help the social planner in identifying
those parents really interested in the service among all potential demanders. In this context,
access criteria might be viewed also as a screening device used by the social planner.
7There may be a third category, including criteria not related to speciﬁc social planner’s
6Thus, according to these access criteria, public childcare can be viewed both
as a tool to help families to reconcile work and parenthood during the child-
bearing years, and as a social service aimed to support the early education and
the social inclusion of children from low income families and stressful environ-
ments.8. From the social planner’s point of view, both outcomes are particularly
important for Italy. On one hand, in fact, nearly 30 percent of mothers leave
their jobs after the birth of the ﬁrst child and the probability of leaving the labor
market after childbirth is higher for low educated mothers and in areas with lim-
ited childcare (Bratti et al., 2005; Pronzato, 2009). On the other hand among
low income households eligible for childcare, a growing number of children are
from immigrant families implying the importance of institutions favouring their
social integration (Dalla Zuanna et al., 2011).
4 Theoretical Framework
In this section, we present a framework that helps interpret our econometric
models and results.The municipalities’ decisions regarding the supply of child-
care slots depends on the local budget constraint and preferences of the local
government. We assume that local governments aim to encourage women’s work
(which would also increase the tax base that can be used to pay for local ser-
vices, including childcare) and to increase the educational outcomes of children
through public childcare.
The objective of the municipality is given by
U(L,E)
where L is the participation of mothers (of young children) and E is an indicator
of the educational outcomes of children in the local area. The social planner
seeks to maximize her objective by manipulating (ﬁnal) demand, which is ac-
complished by using the policy variables at disposal. We assume that the policy
variables are: N, the number of public childcare slots; P, the price charged
each households for a slot; and R, the rules used to assign slots to potential
demanders in the case of excess demand at the price P. In this simple model,
we assume that the price P is the same for all households. Given the popula-
tion of potential demanders (mothers with young children), there exists a set of
households that would gain access to public childcare under (N,R,P).I nt h i s
set of households, we say that the number L∗(N,R,P) would work and that the
educational outcome of all children is given by E∗(N,R,P). Hence, the social
planner solves the following maximization problem:
objectives but often used as a priority criteria when candidates have equal scores: for example,
being in the waiting list or attending the facility the previous year, income or the availability
of grandparents.
8According to Antonelli and Grembi (2010), who collected information on accessibility
criteria adopted in a sample 144 Italian municipalities, the second criteria seem to prevail, that




We now consider the constraints on the social planner’s choices. A social
planner may use rationing as a means to maximize her objective function. For
example, if the social planner wants to increase maternal employment, she could
do so by limiting access and making maternal employment one of the criteria for
acquiring a slot. Diﬀerent rationing criteria may be utilized if the social plan-
ner wants to increase the educational outcomes of children in this population.
Viewed in this way, rationing and selective access are outcomes of a mechanism
design implemented by the social planner. The monetary constraint the social
planner faces is given by
C × N = S + P × N
where C is the cost of each childcare slot sustained by the municipality; S
are the ﬁxed subsidies that the central government has allocated to the local
government; and P, the price per slot. Hence, the number of slots the social
planner can provide given S and P is
N = S/(C − P).
As the social planner increases the price (P), the number of slots increases. We
assume that for any N, potential demand is such that there exists a P∗(N)
allowing demand to exactly equal supply (N) at that price. In this case, the
price serves to "ration" demand, and the rules R are irrelevant: only households
with a willingness to pay for childcare greater than or equal to P∗ would get a
slot. This implies that, in such cases, only households with higher income or
those highly valuing childcare would be able to pay for this service.
Thus, at any P less than P*(N), there will be excess demand and the ra-
tioning rules become operative, selecting potential demanders whose character-
istics and choices the social planner values. By lowering the price and creating
excess demand, the social planner can choose individuals who acquire the slots
instead of having the "market" to do this strictly through the price mechanism.
However, there is a cost to this selection, in that fewer slots can be generated.
At P =0 , the municipality can choose perfectly how to allocate the slots to
households which are eligible according to the allocation criteria R. But, in this
case, the supply of slots may be very low given that S will be the only source
of program revenue.
We now consider the demand side. The probability of childcare use depends
on mothers’ wages, non-labor income, preferences, and childcare price P.M o t h -
ers know only P and do not know R. Even if they do know the rationing criteria,
since they are assumed not to know who else may be applying for a slot, they
cannot assess the likelihood of getting a slot should they apply. Since we as-
sume that the application cost is minimal, anyone with a demand for childcare
at price P in the absence of rationing will apply.
In our framework, we assume that mothers care about consumption (includ-
ing expenditure for children), leisure and children’s educational quality. Since
8a mother’s working status and childcare use are strongly related, we posit that
they have a choice set containing four elements and that, within each choice,
the mother chooses an optimal amount of time, τ, to spend with the children.
In the following table, we deﬁne the mother’s value of each work-childcare use
combination.
WORK CHILDCARE USE VALUE
00 m a x τ M(Y,T − τ,θτ)
10 m a x τ M(Y + W,T − τ − h∗,θτ)
01 m a x τ M(Y − P,T − τ,θτ + ζh∗)
11 m a x τ M(Y + W − P,T − τ − h∗,θτ+ ζh∗),
where Y is non-labor income, W is the mother’s wage, T is the total time
endowment of the mother, θ is the mother’s (educational) productivity of time
with her child and ζ is the (educational) productivity of childcare time. The
time at work of a working mother is h∗,w h i c hi sa l s ot h ea m o u n to ft i m et h e
child spends in public childcare (even for mothers using childcare who do not
work). In this framework, we allow mothers to use childcare, even if they do
not work.
According to the four categories deﬁned above, only the third and the fourth
would explicitly apply for childcare. In case of an excess demand of childcare,
slots have to be rationed so as to maximize the social planner’s preferences.
Following the eligibility criteria, the social planner evaluates their applications.
They would be able to get a slot only in case their characteristics match the
social planner’s requirements. If the social planner values more conciliation
criteria (see Section 3), she would give priority to children with working mothers
(the fourth category in our model). Instead, if the social planner values more
the criteria related to socio-economic status, she would give priority to children
coming from disadvantaged backgrounds: these children would receive better
educational inputs attending public childcare than at home. In our model, these
children might refer to the third category of women. In fact, we argue that the
mother may not choose childcare evaluating her own "educational productivity"
with respect to childcare’s educational productivity. Instead, the social planner
may decide allocation mechanisms in order to identify those households where
family investments in child education may be insuﬃcient (for example, due
to market failures, such as asymmetric information or liquidity constraints).
As pointed out in Bosi and Silvestri (2008), parents might be myopic in their
childcare choices, as they do not thoroughly evaluate the educational role of
childcare. Instead, the social planner might value the beneﬁt given by childcare
in terms of human capital accumulation and development of children. In the
model above, women belonging to the third category would be able to get a slot
if the social planner values their "educational productivity" to be lower than
that of childcare, i.e., θ ≤ ζ.
Even though eligibility requirements may be diﬀerent across local areas,
producing mixed types of eligible households, we expect that when childcare
coverage is rationed, it has a stronger impact on mothers’ working status and
on children’s educational outcomes, since it selects groups which are more likely
9to beneﬁt from the services.
5 Estimation Methods
We think of the value of working for mother i in province p to be a function
of her and the father’s characteristics, Hip, and the child’s characteristics, Xip.
For example, Hip includes the mother’s educational level, which will partially
determine the wage oﬀers she receives in the market and may also indicate
her “tastes” for work. There are of course other unmeasured characteristics of
the household and child that are important determinants of the mother’s labor
market participation decision, which are reﬂected in the disturbance term εip.
We also include the number of public childcare slots available in the province
in the equation, Np. Our rationale for doing so is the following. One determi-
nant of the mother’s willingness to supply time to the labor market is the price
of child care. If we view the public child care market as being approximately
“competitive,” then the supply of childcare slots would equal the demand at the
equilibrium price P. Now imagine that the demand for childcare services was
approximately the same across all provinces, but that provinces were diﬀeren-
tiated in the cost of supplying childcare slots. Then the (equilibrium) number
of childcare slots in province p, Np, would be inversely related to the price of
childcare in the province, Pp. Since we do not observe the price, we use Np as
an indicator of it in our baseline “competitive markets” model.
We construct an equation for the determination of child i in province p0s
cognitive ability scores, Eip. These outcomes are functions of household parental
and child characteristics, as in the previous case, as well as a disturbance term.
We do not know if a particular child actually attended childcare, so the variable
Np is an indicator of the likelihood that she or he did (since it reﬂects the price
of child care in the area). If Np is inversely related to the price of childcare, thus
making the use of it more likely, and if attending public childcare is beneﬁcial in
terms of cognitive development, we expect to see a positive relationship between
Np and child test scores under our competitive view of childcare provision.
T h u st h es y s t e mw ee s t i m a t eh a st h ef o r m :
Lip = X0
ipα1 + H0
ipα2 + α3Np + εip (1)
Eip = X0
ipδ1 + H0
ipδ2 + δ3Np + ωip (2)
where Lip is a binary variable equal to 1 if the mother of child i in province p
works (when the child is enrolled in second grade) and Eip is child i’s cognitive
outcome, proxied by child i’s scores in language and math tests. Xip and Hip
are vectors of children’s and parents’ characteristics. The variable Np represents
public childcare coverage at the level of the province (which is as we discussed
above we interpret as a proxy for price, conditional on demand)9 The properties
9The provincial level is the lowest for which we can obtain data on public childcare supply.
Even though the main policy maker in childcare provision is the municipality (see Section
10of the disturbance terms, εip and ωip, are discussed below.
We now consider how rationing impacts Lip and Eip. In practice, under
rationing, both the likelihood of obtaining a childcare slot and, given the oﬀer
of a slot, the actual cost of it to the parents is potentially a function of household
and child characteristics. It may be helpful to think of this situation reﬂecting
nonlinear prices for childcare slots. In a regime with rationing and assignment
of slots based on household characteristics, both the tota
l number of slots in the province and household characteristics determine the
price of childcare, and hence the likelihood that it is utilized. In this case, the
impact of parental characteristics, for example, on the labor market participa-
tion behavior of mothers will reﬂect both the eﬀects of these characteristics that
we expect to observe in the competitive childcare market case and, in addition,
the impacts of these characteristics on the price of childcare. Our empirical
strategy is to deﬁne an indicator variable, dp, which assumes the value 1 if
household i lives in a province p with a high degree of rationing and equals 0
when this is not the case. As we will describe in Section 6, for each province
p we compute a measure of rationing Rp,deﬁned as the ratio of applications to
available slots. Then we will say that province p has a high degree of rationing
if Rp ≥ ¯ R, in which case dp =1 . We reestimate the model with various values of
¯ R to determine the sensitivity of our results to this essentially arbitrary choice.
We perform a test to determine if rationing signiﬁcantly alters the relation-
ship between household and child characteristics and outcomes, in the standard
way. In particular, deﬁne
Lip = X0
ipα1 + H0
ipα2 + α3Np + dpX0
ipα4 + dpH0
ipα5 + α6dpNp + εip (3)
Eip = X0
ipδ1 + H0
ipδ2 + δ3Np + dpX0
ipδ4 + dpH0
ipδ5 + δ6dpNp + ωip (4)
Then rationing does not have a statistically signiﬁcant impact on these outcome
measures when
α4 = α5 = α6 =0
δ4 = δ5 = δ6 =0 .
We now consider the properties of the disturbance terms, which we will have
to know to carry out the hypothesis test just described. The disturbances εip
and ωip are composite error terms that are deﬁned as follows:
εip = αp +  ip (5)
ωip = δp + υip, (6)
where αp and δp are province-speciﬁc components, assumed to be normally
distributed, while  ip and υip stand for disturbance errors at individual level.
3), we may reasonably assume that policies for very young children (such as childcare) are
homogeneous within the same province.
11In order to take into account the error components at provincial level, we
estimate the above equation using GLS (or Random Eﬀects -RE) model. More-
over, since we are using mixed-level data, including information at the individual
and provincial levels, it is likely that observations in the same province are not
independent, so standard regression techniques attribute too large levels of sta-
tistical signiﬁcance to coeﬃcient estimates (Moulton, 1990). Thus, following
Primo et al. (2007), we adopt cluster-adjustments of the estimates of the stan-
dard errors to account for non-independence of observations within the same
province.10
The coeﬃcients of interest are α3 in Equation (1) and δ3 in Equation (2) in
t h eb a s es p e c i ﬁcation. Using the aggregate number of slots available in the local
area (the province) allows us to claim that there is little scope for endogeneity
between the childcare measure and the composite disturbance term in any of
the individual-level outcome equations. In fact, using information on childcare
coverage at provincial level avoids the usual problem of selection and sorting of
children and parents in individual childcare attendance. However, we need to
discuss some issues related to the assumptions implied by the model.
The ﬁrst consideration refers to the orthogonality assumption and to the
absence of correlation between the province components, αp and δp, and the
included regressors. Actually, the availability of public childcare may be corre-
lated with some province’s characteristics that may aﬀect mothers’ participation
in the labor market or children’s cognitive outcomes. Consider ﬁrst the partic-
ipation equation (Equation (1)). It would be the case that provinces more ori-
ented to gender-equality are also more developed in terms of work opportunities
for women and of policies for reconciling work and family committments (such
as childcare). The correlation between childcare coverage and these provincial
characteristics may lead to overestimate the true childcare impact on the par-
ticipation of mothers with young children. In the absence of longitudinal data,
which would allow us to condition on unobserved province ﬁxed eﬀects, we can-
not estimate the direct impact of child care slots and rationing (purged of these
other confounding eﬀects) in a ﬂexible manner. Our second best option is to
include province-level regressors that reﬂect provincial resources. The only such
variable directly available to us is GDP per capita. Now consider equation (2) for
test scores. In this case, public childcare supply may be correlated with higher
public expenditure in education and better school systems that allow children
to get better results at school. The correlation between childcare coverage and
high-quality public education may lead us to overestimate the true childcare
eﬀect. As in Equation (1), we condition on GDP per capita in order to take
into account diﬀerent public expenditure for education among provinces.
Second, we should consider the potential measurement error in the childcare
variable, Np. In fact, information on public childcare coverage at province level
is available only for 2005, while children enrolled in second grade in 2008-09
would have been aged 2 years in 2002-2003.11. Our childcare measure is po-
10We adjust standard errors for 100 clusters, i.e. the number of provinces in our sample.
11See Section 6 for further descriptions of data on public childcare coverage.
12tentially diﬀerent from the "true" childcare availability faced by the households
in our sample. This measurement error, i.e. the diﬀerence between observed
childcare coverage in 2005 and the "true" (unobserved) childcare coverage in
2002, is incorporated in the province-speciﬁc error components αp and δp.I n
order to get consistent estimates from Equations (1) and (2), we need to deﬁne
measurement error as having zero mean and being uncorrelated with the ob-
served measure of childcare. We need to assume that the diﬀerence in childcare
supply between 2002 and 2005 is uncorrelated with other unobservable char-
acteristics, at province level, which aﬀect the outcomes of interest.12 Recent
reports on childcare provision in Italy (Istituto Degli Innocenti, 2009) conﬁrm
that childcare growth has been very limited in this period. In other words,
although uncorrectly measured, we may argue that childcare coverage in 2005
can be considered a good proxy for childcare coverage in 2002.
The third consideration refers to the interpretation of our coeﬃcients esti-
mates. Consider ﬁrst the participation equation. In Equation (1), we estimate
the eﬀect of childcare coverage when the child is very young on mother’s work-
ing status when the child is enrolled in second grade (aged 7 years, if regular in
his/her school path). Actually, we do not know information on mothers’ work
history neither on mothers’ employment status before and after childbirth. This
information would allow us to control for some mother’s unobservables that may
inﬂuence her decision to work and to better understand the mechanisms deriv-
ing from additional public childcare slots. Due to the limitations and the cross-
sectional nature of our data, we can only interpret the parameter of interest
in Equation (1), α3, as an average eﬀect. Given the level of childcare avail-
able, mothers may behave (in terms of employment decisions after childbirth)
in diﬀerent ways. While some of them would have interrupted employment
after childbirth, regardless of childcare availability, others may have had the
opportunity to go back to work even if childcare were not available. Only those
"at the margin" would have beneﬁted from childcare availability, in the sense
that the additional childcare slot may have increased their probability to con-
tinue working. Recent studies show that in Italy female employment is a very
"persistent" phenomenon in women’s life cycle and that work interruption after
childbirth crucially aﬀects women’s career and their future employment (Bratti
et al., 2005; Del Boca and Sauer, 2009). Thus, we may argue that childcare
availability might play a role for women working before childbirth, because it
may weaken the negative trend of female employment after childbirth. Instead,
childcare might have no or very low eﬀect for women not working before child-
birth. Since our data do not allow to disentangle these eﬀects, the coeﬃcient
for childcare coverage would represent an average between these heterogeneous
impacts.13 Consider now Equation (2). Also in this case, our childcare vari-
able refers to the average childcare supply at provincial level and we do not
12This assumption implies that measurement error is only correlated with the unobserved
measure of childcare coverage, i.e. childcare coverage in 2002.
13However, women heterogeneity may not aﬀect our estimates of childcare coverage impacts
as long as it is captured by the individual error component, ip and it is homogeneous within
the same province.
13know whether a child was enrolled in childcare or not. Thus, the parameter δ3
identiﬁes the full eﬀect of a change in childcare coverage on children’s cognitive
outcomes in second grade: it captures the total eﬀect of childcare "exposure",
including any eﬀects due to change in public childcare arrangements as well as
any spillover eﬀects on children who were not attending childcare.
Finally, we should take into account that the component of the disturbance
terms  ip and υip may include unobservables of both mothers and children (e.g.
ability). A mother’s ability is very likely to be correlated with her education
and with her employment decisions; moreover, a child’s ability can be correlated
with his/her parental background, included in the model through mother’s and
father’s education, Hip. Therefore, we cannot claim a causal impact of any of
the parents’ variables in both equations.
6D a t a a n d V a r i a b l e s
We use individual data on children’s primary school outcomes in conjunction
with information regarding public childcare coverage at the provincial level.
Data on children’s cognitive outcomes are taken from the Italian Institute
for the Evaluation of the Education System (INVALSI) for 2008-2009. INVALSI
and its National Evaluation Service (SNV) provide the only ongoing national
survey of students’ educational achievements at primary school. These assess-
ments measure the abilities of students in second and ﬁfth grades (ISCED level
1), normally aged 7 and 10 years 14
In addition to test scores, INVALSI provides information on the children’s
and parents’ characteristics reported by the schools. Thus, the data include
individual-level covariates indicating gender, citizenship, parents’ working status
and education. However, missing information on family characteristics repre-
sents over 30 percent of observations and missing data on the children’s personal
characteristics are almost 11 percent. Even though missing data may not be sys-
tematically linked with our analysis, we ﬁnd that immigrant children, on which
school administrations may not have records, are more likely to have personal
and/or family missing information.15 Thus, we have decided not to drop them
and to include dummy variables indicating whether family or child information
is missing.
For our analysis, we rely on data concerning second grade students in the
school year 2008-09. Our ﬁnal sample consists of all second graders who took
both language and math tests. Thus, at the end we have 43,073 observations
in test scores regressions, while in the estimation of Equation (1) we keep only
observations without family information missing and we end up with 27,673
observations.
14See Appendix A for details on INVALSI data and on the design and implementation of
INVALSI assessments.
15In order to deeply analyze this point, we perform probit regressions using as dependent
variables dummies indicating whether child or family information is missing. Results are
available upon request from the authors.
14In conjunction with with our sample of children attending second grade in
2008-2009 the most appropriate measure of childcare coverage would be in 2002-
2003 (when the children in our sample were 2 years old). However data on public
childcare coverage at provincial level are available only for 2005. As pointed out
in Section 5, the growth of childcare during this period has been very limited
so the actual numbers did not change signiﬁcantly in the two years.
Childcare coverage is deﬁned as the percentage ratio between public childcare
slots and the population aged 0-2 years, by province. Data are taken from
Cittadinanzattiva (Cittadinanzattiva, 2007), an independent organization that
has been running a yearly survey to monitor supply and prices of public facilities,
including childcare services.
In order to take into account the role of rationing, we use data on childcare
applications and the number of available slots in the main municipality of each
province, that can be found in Cittadinanzattiva (2007). Using these data, we
construct an indicator of rationing, deﬁned as the ratio between the number of
applications ﬁled and the number of accepted applications (i.e., the available
slots). This index,in our sample, is never less than one: the greater its value,
t h em o r es e v e r ei sr a t i o n i n g .
Table 1 gives the deﬁnition of each variable, while Table 2 provides some
descriptive statistics.
In this analysis, we consider three dependent variables. The ﬁrst, mother’s
working status, is a dummy equal to one if the child’s mother works and equal
to zero otherwise. As we can see from Table 2, almost 62 percent of children
in our sample have mothers participating in the labor market. The average
partecipation rate of mothers in Italy is lower (56 percent) than the average
in our sample. However, if we consider only mothers aged 25-54 with children
between 6 and 11 years old, the average partecipation rate is 61 per cent,16 that
is closer to the value we ﬁnd for our sample.
The other two dependent variables refer to children scholastic achievements.
They represent children’s scores in language and mathematics tests provided
by INVALSI. Since these tests are composed by multiple-choices questions, the
ﬁnal test score is built as percentage of correct answers over the total number
of questions. As shown in Table 2, children perform better in language than in
math, being the average test score in language 66.2, while average test score in
math is only 55.5; the distribution of language test scores is more right-skewed
than that of mathematics.
The second panel of Table 1 deﬁnes the variables on childcare availability.
The main variable of interest is childcare coverage at province level. Public
childcare coverage is, on average, only 8.07, and the median childcare availability
is equal to 6.77. Childcare is also highly diﬀerentiated across Italian provinces,
ranging from values close to 0 in some Southern Italian areas to more than 24
percent in some Northern Italian areas. The index of rationing, on average, is
equal to 1.68 and ranges from 1 to 3.94, implying that Italian provinces diﬀer
also in terms of likelihood to get a slot.
16Data from Eurostat referred to 2009.
15The third panel of Table 1 deﬁnes personal, household and environmental
characteristics used as regressors in the analysis. In our analysis, we control only
for child’s gender and citizenship17, together with parents’ level of education and
GDP per capita by province.18
As described in Table 2, ﬁfty percent of the children are male, and only
4 percent are immigrants.19 This percentage is lower than the corresponding
one of the entire population, since the total percentage of non-Italian students
in second grade is about 8 percent (MIUR, 2009). Mothers are more likely to
have tertiary education than fathers: 16 per cent versus 14 percent of fathers.
Finally, for 36 percent of our initial sample we do not have information on
parents’ education or mother occupation, while for 11 percent of children we
lack information on gender or citizenship. These descriptive statistics conﬁrm
that missing data are a problematic issue here. GDP, on average, is equal to
23.15 thousands Euros, and ranges from 12 to 36 thousands of Euros.
Figures 3 and 4 report the correlations between childcare coverage and the
outcomes of interest at the regional level. Regions with higher childcare coverage
are characterized by higher mothers’ employment rate and better results in
language test scores: correlation coeﬃcients between childcare coverage and
both mother’s working status and average language test score are positive and
signiﬁcant while are not signiﬁcant for math.
7 Empirical Results
In this section, we present the empirical results based on equations (1) and
(2). First, we report the results from the base model. Then, in order to test
the hypothesis that childcare impacts would be diﬀerent under rationing, we
perform the same analysis on diﬀerent subsamples characterized by diﬀerent
levels of rationing. The results are presented in Section 7.2. Finally, we investi-
gate whether childcare coverage may have heterogeneous eﬀects, exploring the
potential role of diﬀerent accessibility criteria adopted by the social planner. In
Section 7.3 we present the results for heterogenous eﬀects.
17We do not control for child’s age. Actually, INVALSI provides only information on child’s
year of birth or regularity in his school path (whether retained or enrolled in higher grade with
respect to his age). However, child’s age may aﬀect our estimates, especially because childcare
coverage in 2005 may diﬀer from the true childcare coverage faced by children with diﬀerent
ages. In order to test this point, we replicate the analysis considering only children regular
in their school path (37,421 observations) and results do not diﬀer from the ones presented in
Section 7. Results are available upon requests from the authors.
18Data on GDP per capita by province are taken from Camera di Commercio, Statistical
Service, and refer to gross domestic product in 2008.
19Children without Italian citizenship include both children born abroad and children born
i nI t a l yw i t hb o t hp a r e n t so ff o r e i g no r i g i n . I t a l i a nl a wi sb a s e do nt h ep r i n c i p l eo fj u s
sanguinis: children of foreign parents are foreign citizens up to their 18th birthday, then they
may apply for Italian citizenship.
167.1 Base Model
In this section we discuss the results of the estimation of equation 1 and
2. When estimating the ﬁrst equation in which mother’s working status is the
dependent variable, we only keep observations without missing data on family
characteristics, which reduces our sample to 27,673 observations. In Table 3 we
compare the mean characteristics in the diﬀerent samples used for the estimation
which show that most variables are not statistically diﬀerent across samples.
Table 4 reports the coeﬃcients of the independent variables on mother’s
working status. The coeﬃcient of childcare coverage is positive and signiﬁcant:
an additional 10 percentage points in childcare coverage increase the mother’s
probability of working by 13 percentage points. As discussed above mother’s
working status is observed when the child is enrolled in second grade. Even
in provinces where childcare 0-2 is scarce, a number of mothers have had the
opportunity to go back to work, when their children were enrolled in childcare
3-5 or in primary school. So diﬀerences in mothers’employment rate across
provinces are mitigated by the fact that mothers are observed when children
have access to pre-primary and primary school, which are more homogenouosly
distributed across provinces.The fact that we still ﬁnd a positive impact of
childcare coverage on mother’s work means that care opportunities provided by
childcare services play a crucial role in helping mothers to keep their job after
childbirth. Thus, childcare availability may weaken the negative relationship
between mother’s employment and fertility and decrease the likelihood of work
interruption after the birth of a child.
Child’s gender is not signiﬁcantly associated with mother’s working status,
while immigrant status does matter: mothers of non-Italian children are less
likely to work than those of Italian children; the coeﬃcient for being non-Italian
is negative and signiﬁcant. Mothers’ working status, as expected, is strongly and
signiﬁcantly associated with her education, conﬁrming previous results in this
strand of the literature, especially for Italy (Del Boca et al., 2009). The same
is true for the father’s education: mothers married to highly educated partners
are more likely to work, indicating "assortative mating" between partners. We
add as controls variables child missing information which is statistically equal
to zero and GDP by province, which is positively and signiﬁcantly correlated
with mother’s working status.
In the second and third columns of Table 4 we report the coeﬃcients on
language and math test scores Childcare coverage aﬀects positively language
test score, while its impact on math test score is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero. A 10 percentage points increase in childcare avalability is associated
with an increase of 1.8 points in language test scores. In fact, cognitive skills
used in the language test may beneﬁt more from socialization and from other
activities taken up at childcare facilities; instead, math skills seem more linked
to innate abilities and may beneﬁt less from the interactions with other children
in the ﬁrst years of life. Our result is consistent with previous ﬁndings (Felfe
and Lavine, 2010), showing that local availability of childcare has a positive
impact on the short run development only of language skills. Since we do not
17have information on individual childcare attendance, we interpret this result
as the eﬀect of childcare coverage on children’s outcomes, including potential
externalities and spillover eﬀects
We ﬁnd a positive and signiﬁcant impact of both paternal and maternal ed-
ucation on children’s test scores. The eﬀect of parental schooling on children’s
outcomes may work through diﬀerent channels: more educated parents have,
on average, higher income, and can purchase more (or higher quality) goods for
their children; they may have stronger preferences for investing in education, and
spend time with children doing homework. On the other hand, more educated
parents have higher opportunity cost from not-working, potentially limiting the
amount of time they spend with their children. Finally, the correlation be-
tween parental and children’s education could just be due to the transmission
of genes. Recent literature focusing on the intergenerational transmission of
schooling (Pronzato, 2010; Holmlund et al, 2010) has shown a positive impact
of both parents even when controlling for the unobserved ability transmitted
by the parents to the children.However, they show that these causal eﬀects are
much lower than the spurious eﬀects obtained by not taking into account un-
observed ability. In our empirical work, we ﬁnd that the coeﬃcients are greater
for language than for math, but they do not diﬀer between parents.
Gender coeﬃcients are quite diﬀerent across subjects: boys achieve, on av-
erage, higher test scores in mathematics and lower test scores in language than
girls. This result is coherent with the comparative analysis of Guiso et al.
(2008) which report that girls perform more poorly than boys in mathematics
but better than boys in reading. Their cross-country analysis show that the
girls’ underperformance in math relative to boys is better in countries which
exhibit more gender equality.
Non-Italian children perform worse than their Italian peers and, as expected,
test score gaps are higher for language than for mathematics. Finally, coeﬃ-
cients for child missing information are never statistically signiﬁcant, while hav-
ing missing family information is always signiﬁcant in test scores regressions.
GDP is positively and signiﬁcantly correlated with both language and math
test scores.
7.2 Rationing in public childcare access
We now use several thresholds of rationing for identifying subsamples with
diﬀerent levels of rationing. We expect that, other things being equal, the higher
the rationing the higher the probability that getting a slot depends on eligibil-
ity criteria. If the service is highly rationed, access criteria will become more
stringent, and the smaller number of children/households targeted is expected
to be more responsive to childcare coverage. To interpret the results we need to
keep in mind that in each sub-sample, we are comparing outcomes in provinces
with diﬀerent childcare availability but with a similar strength of rationing (in
the same interval). Suppose we have two provinces: in province A a proportion
DA of households applies for a childcare slot, while in province B the proportion
of applicants is given by DA ∗ k = DB. We may expect the two populations
18of applicants to be quite similar (for example, for women’s willingness to work)
even if diﬀerent in size (whose relationship is given by k). Suppose the number
of slots available is half in both cases, leading to the same level of rationing:
province B would still have higher availability than province A. In fact, childcare
coverage is NA = DA/2 in province A and NB =( DA ∗ k)/2 in province B. In
province B more households "at the margin" will receive the treatment com-
pared to province A, justifying the positive and signiﬁcant eﬀects of childcare
coverage on the outcomes of interest.20
We re-estimate the base model with the independent variables interacted
with dp =1 ,indicating various values of ¯ R to determine the sensitivity of our
results . We deﬁne high degree of rationing if ¯ R is greater than -respectively-the
ﬁrst quartile, the median, and the third quartile
Tables 5 and 6 report the results for mother’s working status and children’s
test scores based on the estimation of equation 3 and equation 4. In both
speciﬁcations, we interact childcare coverage as well as other variables which
are potential indicators for eligibility criteria (mother, father education and
child non italian) with diﬀerent rationing levels.
Childcare coverage coeﬃcients are always positive and signiﬁcant in mother’s
working status regressions, and the impact is stronger for high level of rationing.
A 10 percentage increase in childcare supply induces a percentage increase in
the mothers’ probability of working ranging from 16, when the threshold is low,
to 19 when the threshold is high.
Table 6 reports the coeﬃcients of the regressions with language and math
test scores as dependent variables. The childcare coverage coeﬃcients are always
positiveandsigniﬁcant on language test score. Only in areas with high rationing,
the coeﬃcient of childcare is positive and signiﬁcant not only for language but
also for math.These results support the notion that households "at the margin"
in high rationing areas are more responsive to changes in childcare availability.
We then perform F tests in order to determine if rationing signiﬁcantly
alters the relationship between a set of household chracteristics, child care and
outcomes.Our results shows that rationing have a statistically signiﬁcant impact
on these outcome measures (Table 7). The null hypothesis:
α4 = α5 = α6 =0
δ4 = δ5 = δ6 =0 .
is then rejected for mother working status in low rationing, while for chil-
dren test scores only in high rationing. It is possible to interpret this diﬀerence
using the framework described above. It is possible that when the availability
20Felfe and Lavine (2010) ﬁnd that in areas with high childcare availability the impact is
larger than in areas with low childcare availability. They argue that when childcare supply is
low mainly highly educated and highly motivated parents are actively engaged in application
for childcare and that slots allocation follows a "ﬁrst come, ﬁrst served" mechanism, so that
only children with highly educated parents are actually enrolled. However, they may beneﬁt
less from childcare attendance than children from disadvantaged background. Instead, in our
case, selection of applicants is implemented by the social planner who targets households and
children that may beneﬁtm o r ef r o mt h ep o l i c y .
19of slots are large enough relatively to demand, the social planner may give pri-
ority to women working, while when the availability of slots becomes relatively
scarce,may give priority to disadvantaged children.
Due to the limitations of our data, however, we cannot say much about the
decision-making process of the social planner. In other words, since we do have
information on the eligibility criteria adopted by each municipality, we are not
able to disentangle the eﬀect of rationing. In order to explore the potentially
diﬀerent childcare impacts according to accessibility criteria, we replicate the
analysis for diﬀerent subsamples, identiﬁed by mother’s level of education and
wealth of the province.
7.3 Heterogenous eﬀects
As pointed out in Section 3, accessibility criteria diﬀer across municipali-
ties and each municipality may value households’ characteristics in a diﬀerent
manner and they can be grouped in two main categories, according to social
planner’s objectives. While the ﬁrst category gives priority to children from
families with working parents, longer work hours, the second gives priority to
children in disadvantaged contexts. We do not know which municipalities or
what proportion of municipalities privilege one criterion rather than the other,
or use some combination of both criteria
From Tables 5 and 6, we observe that childcare eﬀects become stronger when
r a t i o n i n gi sh i g h e r ,a n dt h i ss e e m sp a r t i cularly true for language test scores.
Actually, it is diﬃcult to say whether the relative larger eﬀect on children’s
outcomes is due to the prevalence of municipalities giving more importance
to education of disadvanged children. It might be the case that even giving
priority to children with working mother, childcare would be able to provide
better educational inputs with respect to those the child would have received
staying at home.
In order to explore potential diﬀerences, we re-estimate the base model on
diﬀerent subsamples of the "rationed" sample that is the sample for which ¯ R is
greater than the median. We ﬁrst divide the sample by low educated and high
educated women. We expect that the ﬁrst sub-sample will be more sensitive
to the policy. Low educated women are on average less attached to the labour
market, and cannot aﬀord more expensive private childcare. Childcare provision
may increase their probability of looking for a job, but also provide to their
children better educational inputs than at home.
We then divide the provinces in two groups according to the level of GDP
per capita. We expect that children from poorer backgrounds beneﬁtm o r ef r o m
childcare availability.
Table 8 reports childcare coverage coeﬃcients for both samples. We ﬁnd
strong eﬀects of childcare coverage on mother’s working status for low educated
mothers and in provinces characterized by low GDP.These results conﬁrm pre-
vious works (Del Boca et al., 2009; Del Boca and Sauer, 2009; Bratti et al.,
2005) which show that the availability of childcare (as well as other conciliation
20policies) has a more sizeable eﬀect on less educated women who, according to
economic theory, are in general more responsive to changes in income and prices.
Also, when considering childcare availability impacts are stronger on lan-
guage test scores for children living with low educated mothers and in low GDP
areas, who are likely to beneﬁt more from childcare opportunities than their
counterparts. These results, consistent with previous ﬁndings (Melhuish et al.,
2008; Havnes and Mogstad, 2010), are coherent with the hypothesis that public
childcare may compensate for insuﬃcient investments made by parents, provid-
ing educational opportunities to children living in disadvantaged backgrounds.
We note that our results (both for mother’s working status and language test
scores) are robust both at the individual as well as the aggregate geographical
level.
8C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper we explore the impact of public childcare coverage and ra-
tioning, on mother’s working status and children’s school performances at pri-
mary school. Using INVALSI data for the school year 2008-09, in conjunction
with data on childcare coverage at province level we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant and pos-
itive eﬀect on mother’s working status as well as on language test scores.
In exploring the structure of public childcare, it is crucial to analyze the
social planner decision-making process. In our theoretical framework in which
the municipalities’ decisions regarding the number of childcare slots to supply
depend on the budget constraint and preferences of the local government, and
the social planner may use rationing as a means to maximize her objective func-
tion. Following this approach we estimate models with diﬀerent rationing levels
and perform a test to determine if rationing signiﬁcantly alters the relationship
between household and child characteristics and the outcomes of interest.
Our results show that childcare availability plays a signiﬁcant role both in
increasing mothers’ participation after childbirth and in contributing to chil-
dren’s cognitive development . When we take rationing into account ,we note
that the childcare availability coeﬃcients are always positive and signiﬁcant for
the dependent variables mother working status and language test score, but its
impact is even greater in areas with high levels of rationing. In terms of the
mathematics test score, without conditioning on rationing the coeﬃcient asso-
ciated with availability is insigniﬁcant, but when we condition on rationing we
ﬁnd evidence of a signiﬁcant positive relationship between availability and math
test scores both in low- and high-rationing areas.
These results support the notion that households "at the margin" in high
rationing areas are more responsive to changes in childcare availability. By re-
peating our empirical analysis on subsamples, we showed that childcare impacts
are stronger on the language test scores of children and the working status of
mothers with low education and living in lower income areas, which we take as
an indication of the importance of rationing criteria related to socio-economic
status of the mother and household.
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Childcare coverage across Italian regions (percentage ratio between slots and popula-























































Mother￿ s working status Dummy equal to 1 if the mother works (2008-09)
Language test score Percentage of correct answers in language test (2008-09)
Math test score Percentage of correct answers in math test (2008-09)
Childcare Variables
Childcare coverage Public childcare slots over population 0-2 years by province (2005)
Rationing Ratio of number of applications/number of slots by province (2005)
Control Variables
Male Dummy equal to 1 if male
Non-Italian Dummy equal to 1 if the child has not Italian citinzenship
Father tertiary education Dummy equal to 1 if the father has tertiary education
Mother tertiary education Dummy equal to 1 if the mother has tertiary education
Family information missing Dummy equal to 1 if the child has family information missing
Child information missing Dummy equal to 1 if the child has individual information missing
GDP per capita Gross Domestic Product per capita by province (Thousands Euro)Figure 2
Applications to childcare facilities and available slots (absolute numbers) by region,
2005.
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Correlation coefficient: 0.6644; p-value: 0.001
Own elaborations from INVALSI SNV 2008-09 and Cittadinanzattiva 2007Figure 4
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Correlation coefficient:-0.0079
p-value: 0.9729
Own elaborations from INVALSI SNV 2008-09 and Cittadinanzattiva 2007
Table 2
Descriptive Statistics
Mean SD Median Min Max
Outcome Variables
Mother￿ s working status 062 048 1 0 1
Language test score 6619 2150 7059 294 100
Mathematics test score 5547 1812 5417 417 100
Childcare Variables
Childcare coverage 807 571 677 032 2547
Rationing 168 065 149 1 394
Control Variables
Male 051 049 1 0 1
Non-Italian 004 019 0 0 1
Father tertiary education 014 035 0 0 1
Mother tertiary education 016 037 0 0 1
Family information missing 036 048 0 0 1
Child information missing 011 031 0 0 1
GDP per capita 2315 557 2427 1273 3676Table 3
Mean characteristics of all sample (a), of the subsample used in Equation 1 (b) and of
observations excluded from the estimation in Equation 1 (c).
(a) All sample (b) Sample in Eq. 1 (c) Excluded from Eq.1 t test (a=b) t test (b=c)
Male 051 051 051 ¬026 ¬042
(000) (000) (000)
Non-Italian 004 003 006 773*** 1239***
(000) (000) (000)
Mother education (tertiary) 016 016 018 026 123
(000) (000) (001)
Father education (tertiary) 014 014 020 081 470***
(000) (000) (001)
Childcare coverage 801 766 878 1447*** 1948***
(003) (000) (005)
GDP per-capita 2314 2307 2328 276*** 370***
(003) (000) (004)
N 43073 27673 15400
Notes: t-test for the null hypothesis of equal mean in the two samples (a-b and b-c).
Standard errors in parentheses. Signi￿cance level: *** p<0.01.
Table 4
Estimates from the base RE GLS model.
BASE MODEL
(a) Mother￿ s Working Status (b) Language test score (c) Math test score
Childcare coverage 0013*** 0178*** ¬0012
(0002) (0052) (0047)
Male 0004 ¬1030*** 2188***
(0005) (0202) (0220)
Non-Italian ¬0228*** ¬11062*** ¬5493***
(0022) (0704) (0488)
Mother tertiary education 0241*** 5957*** 4089***
(0014) (0355) (0435)
Father tertiary education 0058*** 5856*** 3302***
(0011) (0359) (0302)
Child Missing Information ¬0009 0327 1110
(0044) (0780) (0826)
Family Missing Information ¬0812￿￿ ¬0661￿
(0395) (0340)
GDP per capita 0007*** 0155*** 0095*
(0002) (0056) (0054)
Constant 0300*** 60657*** 51590***
(0042) (1281) (1323)
Within R-squared 0053 0032 0019
Between R-squared 0463 0153 0046
Overall R-squared 0094 0035 0019
Rho 0044 0019 0027
N.Clusters 100 100 100
N.Observations 27673 43073 43073
Notes: RE (GLS) model. Sample: students enrolled in II Grade 2008-09 performing language and math tests.
In column (a), we keep only observations without missing family information.
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at province level and robust for heteroskedasticity
in case of dichotomous outcome. Signi￿cance levels:* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.Table 5
Estimates by level of rationing in public childcare access. Dependent variable:
mother￿ s working status.
Dep. Var. MOTHER￿ S WORKING STATUS
R>25th perc. R>50th perc. R>75th perc.
Childcare Coverage 0009** 0011*** 0013***
(0004) (0003) (0002)
Childcare Coverage*d 0007* 0007** 0006*
(0004) (0003) (0003)
Male 0004 0004 0004
(0005) (0005) (0005)
Non-Italian ¬0159*** ¬0213*** ¬0227***
(0031) (0032) (0025)
Non-Italian*d ¬0085** ¬0021 0010
(0040) (0044) (0051)
Mother tertiary education 0218*** 0233*** 0240***
(0028) (0020) (0017)
Mother tertiary education*d 0031 0015 0002
(0032) (0028) (0029)
Father tertiary education 0055*** 0048*** 0054***
(0017) (0014) (0012)
Father tertiary education*d 0003 0018 0012
(0022) (0021) (0025)
Constant 0329*** 0315*** 0304***
(0052) (0046) (0042)
Within R-squared 0053 0052 0052
Between R-squared 0495 0495 0485
Overall R-squared 0094 0093 0092
Rho 0043 0045 0043
N.Clusters 97 97 97
N.Observations 27339 27339 27339
Notes: RE (GLS) model. Sample: students enrolled in II Grade 2008-09 performing language
and math tests, without missing family information. Other controls: d, GDP and
child missing information.
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at province level and robust for heteroskedasticity.
Signi￿cance levels:* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.Table 6
Estimates by level of rationing in public childcare access. Dependent variables: lan-
guage and math test scores.
Dep. Var. LANGUAGE SCORE MATH SCORE
R>25th perc. R>50th perc. R>75th perc. R>25th perc. R>50th perc. R>75th perc.
Childcare Coverage 0041 0082 0088* ¬0106 ¬0068 ¬0077*
(0089) (0062) (0050) (0068) (0052) (0045)
Childcare Coverage*d 0184* 0199* 0448*** 0134 0130 0290**
(0109) (0108) (0101) (0097) (0107) (0121)
Male ¬1052*** ¬1053*** ¬1053*** 2179*** 2178*** 2178***
(0203) (0203) (0203) (0222) (0221) (0221)
Non-Italian ¬12092*** ¬10413*** ¬11150*** ¬6366*** ¬5648*** ¬5634***
(1732) (1074) (0904) (1274) (0769) (0636)
Non-Italian*d 1453 ¬1171 0543 1171 0312 0478
(1891) (1404) (1345) (1377) (1004) (0917)
Mother tertiary education 6138*** 5982*** 5819*** 4662*** 4046*** 3697***
(0608) (0441) (0414) (0757) (0557) (0502)
Mother tertiary education*d ¬0216 ¬0001 0583 ¬0706 0174 1623*
(0726) (0671) (0776) (0935) (0874) (0862)
Father tertiary education 5094*** 5760*** 5692*** 2723*** 3175*** 3129***
(0723) (0545) (0412) (0515) (0398) (0326)
Father tertiary education*d 0946 0082 0393 0769 0232 0577
(0827) (0712) (0790) (0621) (0600) (0756)
Constant 61439*** 60865*** 60910*** 52369*** 51754*** 51967***
(1487) (1242) (1231) (1375) (1396) (1306)
Within R-squared 0032 0032 0032 0020 0019 0020
Between R-squared 0190 0187 0228 0071 0065 0111
Overall R-squared 0036 0036 0036 0020 0020 0021
Rho 0020 0019 0017 0026 0026 0026
N.Clusters 97 97 97 97 97 97
N.Observations 42592 42592 42592 42592 42592 42592
Notes: RE (GLS) model. Sample: students enrolled in II Grade 2008-09 performing language and math tests.
Other controls:d, GDP, child missing information and family missing information.
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at province level. Signi￿cance levels:* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Table 7
F-statistics from the estimations using di⁄erent level of rationing in public childcare
access.
R>25th perc. R>50th perc. R>75th perc.
F-test p-value F-test p-value F-test p-value
Dep. Var.: Mother￿ s working status 1044 006 543 036 469 045
Dep. Var.: Language score 362 060 469 045 2876 000
Dep. Var.: Math score 509 040 189 086 1814 000
N with R>treshold 32014 21449 11213
Notes: F-test for the null hypothesis that coe¢ cients of variables interacted with d are jointly equal to zero.
Variables interacted with d are: childcare coverage, non-Italian, mother tertiary education
and father tertiary education.Table 8
Heterogeneous e⁄ects by: (a) mother￿ s level of education; (b) province￿ s GDP per
capita. Childcare coverage coe¢ cients only.
Panel (a) LOW EDUCATED MOTHERS HIGH EDUCATED MOTHERS
Dep. Var. Mother￿ s working status Mother￿ s working status
Childcare coverage 0021*** ¬0001
(0002) (0002)
N 11609 2325
Dep. Var. Language score Language score
Childcare coverage 0265** 0067
(0105) (0125)
N 12139 2447
Dep. Var. Math score Math score
Childcare coverage 0039 0070
(0094) (0141)
N 12139 2447
Panel (b) LOW GDP HIGH GDP
Dep. Var. Mother￿ s working status Mother￿ s working status
Childcare coverage 0019*** 0013￿￿
(0002) (0006)
N 8019 5915
Dep. Var. Language score Language score
Childcare coverage 0235** 0468*
(0095) (0240)
N 12169 9280
Dep. Var. Math score Math score
Childcare coverage 0064 0061
(0106) (0207)
N 12169 9280
Notes: RE (GLS) model. Sample: II grade students living in provinces with R>50th perc. (21449 obs.).
High educated mothers have at least tertiary education; GDP is high if higher than 27 thousands of Euro.
Controls: father with tertiary education, male, non-Italian, child missing information, family missing information.
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at province level and robust for heteroskedasticity
in case of dichotomous outcome. Signi￿cance levels:* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.A The INVALSI data
The Italian Institute for the Evaluation of the Education System (INVALSI)
have begun a yearly survey of learning achievements both at primary and sec-
ondary school in the 2008-09 (speci￿cally in second and ￿fth grades (ISCED
level 1). This evaluation concerned a sample of 45,979 students for each grade,
enrolled in 1,069 schools, representing 8.3 percent of the total population at
primary school.
For second graders, INVALSI de￿nes two assessment tools: a test for lan-
guage and a test for mathematics. Each test is composed by a di⁄erent number
of items (i.e. questions), as shown in the following table. The majority of items
are multiple-choices questions.
Test Time Number of Items
Language 30 minutes 34
Math 30 minutes 24
The main tests are those for language and mathematics. The language test
includes questions on text comprehension, knowledge of Italian grammar and
language and sentence construction. The mathematics test include mathemat-
ics questions which evaluate students￿knowledge of mathematical concepts, use
of number patterns and their ability to read graphs. These tests have been
designed following the experience of the leading international assessments, as
IEA-PIRLS and OCSE-PISA.1 For further details on INVALSI assessment de-
sign see INVALSI (2009).
School administrations provide to INVALSI information on the children￿ s
and parents￿background characteristics. The school sta⁄are required to provide
data on children￿ s gender, birthplace and citizenship, together with information
on parents￿birthplace, education and occupation, as long as they are available
from administrative records.
1The programme IEA (International Association for the evaluation of Educational
Achievemment) and PIRLS (Progress in International Reading Literacy Study) provides in-
ternational assessments of fourth grade students in reading, while the programme OCSE-PISA
(Programme for International Student Assessment) evaluates 15-years-old students across
OECD countries in reading, sciences and math competencies.